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EDITOR'S OBSERVATIONS
The Geology of Drug Policy in 2002
FRANK 0. BOWMAN, III
Associate Professor of Law
Indiana University, School of Law-Indianapolis
My father taught geology at the college in the small southwest Colorado town where I grew up. So
I have always looked at the apparently solid, enduring features of the Earth's surface with the
knowledge that the seeming stasis is an illusion born of my inability to see changes going on
beneath the surface, as well as the disproportion between the span of human life and the scale of
geologic time. There are times when the study of public policy seems akin to prolonged observa-
tion of a range of ancient hills-the seasons change, the winds blow, but the hills endure from
year to year, unmoved and apparently unmovable.
For those of us whose political consciousness extends back at least to the early 1970's, the so-
called "War on Drugs" has been a constant feature of the national landscape. Most people can
scarcely remember a time when federal and state governments were not engaged in a perennial
campaign to eradicate, or at least drastically reduce, the sale and consumption of illegal drugs
through the aggressive enforcement of criminal sanctions, interdiction, forfeiture, public educa-
tion, and (to a lesser degree) drug treatment. For those who deplore the anti-drug effort's heavy
reliance on incarceration of sellers and users, the "drug war" seems an ineradicable evil. For those
who see drug use as the true evil, the necessity ofperserverance and unyielding stringency is an
article of faith.
Nonetheless, there are signs that the ground is shifting. Public concern about drug abuse as a
major issue in American life may be ebbing. The notion that "the drug war is a failure" has
become the common wisdom in academic and journalistic circles. Support for routine and lengthy
imprisonment of non-violent drug offenders may be eroding, even among the prosecutors, police,
and judges whose job it is to enforce the law. Anger among African American, Latino, and other
minority communities at the perceived discriminatory enforcement of drug laws is simmering
and may begin to boil over in ways that effect the political terrain. And after the events of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, the newly declared "War on Terror" may supplant any "war on drugs" as the focus of
the American mind for years to come. All these themes are observable in debates over federal and
state drug policy during the last year or so. In the rest of this essay, I venture a tentative mapping
of the current geology of the national drug policy debate -the plate tectonics, the fault lines, the
erosion, the regions of potential volcanism - and some still more tentative thoughts about how the
accretion of subterranean forces may change the contours of American drug policy.
Continental Drift: Public Opinion
One of the verities of American political life for the last thirty years has been that no politician ever
lost an election by promising to be "tougher" on those who use and sell drugs. This may still be
true in the narrow context of elective politics, but there is a body of evidence suggesting that
public opinion on drug policy is becoming more skeptical and nuanced. In his article, Professor
Ronald Wright notes that in 1989, the Gallup poll showed that 68% of respondents felt illegal
drugs were the nation's most important problem. In December 2001, the figure had fallen to i%.'
A poll commissioned by the ACLU found that 61% of respondents opposed mandatory prison
sentences for non-violent offenders, and that the public "draws a sharp distinction between
trafficking in illicit drugs and buying, possessing, and using illegal drugs."' Ballot initiatives
supporting drug policy reform have passed in more than a dozen states, notably including a recent
successful initiative in California mandating treatment rather than incarceration for certain non-
violent drug offenders. And, as detailed in the article by Judge William Meyer and Denver District
Attorney Bill Ritter4 across the country, the "drug court" movement has been steadily gaining
momentum, with more and more states and localities creating special schemes for adjudicating
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drug crimes and substituting mandatory participation in drug treatment programs for
sentences of incarceration.
Among many, perhaps most, of the intelligentsia, the 'failure" of the 'drug war" is a given,
and a curious alliance of the liberal left and the libertarian right argues for the decriminaliza-
tion or outright legalization of drugs. In the population at large, black Americans have long
perceived that anti-drug efforts have a disproportionate impact in their communities. 5 And at
least some voices in the Hispanic community are beginning to express similar concernsA
Growing unease with law-enforcement-based anti-drug strategies even crosses international
boundaries. For example, Great Britain is in the midst of a debate over a report by a parlia-
mentary committee urging a new anti-drug philosophy of "harm reduction rather than
retribution.'7
Still, it would be at the least premature, and probably just plain inaccurate, to claim that
the American public is now actively opposed to incarcerating those who sell narcotics.
(Indeed the ACLU's own poll suggests that, when asked, most people say they favor impris-
oning drug sellers.8) Nonetheless, it seems hard to deny that the national disposition toward
drug offenders has turned less punitive and more therapeutic. The unanswered, and probably
unanswerable, question is: how deep and how enduring is the apparent shift in public mood?
Any truly dramatic change in national policy -for example, a repudiation of the lengthy
mandatory drug sentences now imposed by federal and many state governments - presup-
shard to deny that the poses a public disposed to accept such a change in direction. I use the word "accept"
It seems hadvisedly, because I do not believe that the public would have to be clamoring for change in
national disposition toward drug order for change to occur. Rather, the necessary preconditions for change would be: (i)
powerful currents of opinion among the interested elements of the political class -lawyers,
offenders has turned less punitive and judges, penological professionals, journalists, academics, ethnic and professional advocacy
more therapeutic. groups - favoring change, coinciding with (2) a public attitude that is at least sufficiently
ambivalent about current drug policy that a majority of politicians perceive no crippling
political cost to voting for change.
What is the likelihood that the tectonic plates of professional opinion, public attitude, and
political safety will align themselves favorably for drug policy change anytime soon?
Field Work: Are Anti-Drug Efforts Working?
A centerpiece of the argument that drug policy should be changed is the contention that
current enforcement-based strategies do not work, that, in the rhetoric of drug policy critics,
'the war on drugs is a failure." In order to assess this contention dispassionately, one must
first consider the deeply unfortunate phrase 'war on drugs."
It is easy to declare metaphorical war on things. Several weeks ago, I ran an internet
search and discovered (in addition to the "war on drugs," the war on terror, and the good old
War on Poverty) that there was a war on waste happening at the Pentagon, that "geeks had
declared war on Intel," that protesters in San Francisco had declared war on copyright law,
that the Canadian Labour Party had declared war on certain contract legislation in British
Columbia, and that a Montana high school had declared a war on weeds. Most of the time, of
course, all this war-mongering is just harmless rhetorical excess. But when a government
consciously chooses the word "war" to describe a national policy initiative, as the United
States government has persistently done since the early 1970's when President Nixon first
declared a "War on Drugs," then it behooves us to pay careful attention.
Politicians declare war on things in order to emphasize both the seriousness of the threat
and the seriousness of the government's resolve to meet the threat. A war by implication calls
for mobilization of public resources, for sacrifice, for intense applications of state power, and
where necessary for the use of armed force. Critics of American drug policy have often
decried the warfare metaphor precisely because it is used to justify tactics the critics think
excessive. And while they have a point, the government's persistent, one might almost say
stubborn, embrace of the idea of a "War on Drugs" has always been a huge boon to drug
policy critics because it mischaracterizes the nature of the problem and creates expectations
that no government measures will ever be able to meet.
War calls for extraordinary measures precisely because it is, or is at least supposed to be,
an extraordinary condition. In the American mind, a war has a beginning, a phase of intense
struggle, and an end - a point at which one side (presumably us) triumphs and the other side
FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER • VOL. 14, NO. 3-4 • 2001-2002
HeinOnline  -- 14 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 124 2001-2002
surrenders. At which point, we demobilize, the boys go home, go to college on the GI Bill,
get married, have 2.5 children, and figure out new ways to sell Pepsi to our former enemies.
But of course the "drug war" is nothing like that. Although our opponents include a good
many foreigners, most of the enemy is us. And there will never come a day when America's
druggies throw down their bongs and crack pipes, come out with their hands up, and never,
ever get high again. The simple truth is that a "War on Drugs" can no more achieve total
victory in the form of total eradication of drugs from American-life than a "War on Murder"
could eliminate homicide, or a "War on Thievery" could eliminate property crime. Yet we do
not declare laws against theft and murder a failure and start campaigns to legalize larceny
and homicide. The inherent weaknesses of human nature guarantee that violence, dishon-
esty, and lust for pleasures of the flesh, however destructive to ourselves or others, will
always be with us. In every case except that of drugs, we understand that crime is an
inescapable component of communal life. And we measure our successes and failures in
anti-crime efforts, not against the impossible standard of total victory, but in relative terms,
in terms of the degree to which we have succeeded in minimizing an unavoidable evil.
If we consider America's anti-drug efforts not as warfare but as anti-crime measures,
then the anti-drug programs of the last twenty or thirty years, far from being failures, appear
to have scored some very impressive successes. Professor Stephen Easton, a former United
States Attorney, describes in this Issue how drug use declined markedly from i98o, the
beginning of the first Reagan Administration, until 1992, the beginning of the first Clinton
Administration, rose slightly through 1996, and then essentially leveled off, still at levels far
below those of i98o.9 Professor Easton argues that there is a direct correlation between the
degree to which presidential administrations emphasize and find anti-drug efforts and the
extent of illicit drug use in the country.
There are certainly points at which Professor Easton may be pressing the temporal
correlations he observes beyond their useful limits. For example, even if one assumes that
government anti-drug policy is the primary factor determining the extent of illicit drug use
(in itself a questionable assumption), an exclusive focus on federal government policy
necessarily excludes consideration of state systems where the vast majority of drug prosecu-
tion and treatment takes place. Similarly, I find fairly unconvincing Professor Easton's
intimation that there is a meaningful correlation between the declining number and
percentage of federal drug cases resolved by trial during the 199o's and the apparent modest
increase in drug use in the same period.o Nonetheless, he makes a powerful circumstantial
case for the proposition that, considered as a crime control program, the anti-drug campaign
of the last twenty years or so has been fairly successful.
Professor Easton's work necessarily leaves at least three questions unresolved: First,
whether even significant incremental reductions in illicit drug usage are ultimately worth
the monetary and human costs imposed by a primarily law-enforcement-based drug
strategy? Second, whether similar results could be achieved at lower human and financial
cost? And third, whether increased emphasis on drug treatment and education in addition
to interdiction and incarceration might reduce drug use still more?
More Field Work: Do Drug Courts Work?
A relatively new factor in the drug policy debate is the "drug court," a special jurisdiction
court created to rehabilitate defendants who commit drug crimes, or crimes motivated by
drug use, through compelled participation in drug therapy and intense monitoring and
probationary supervision. The advent and growing prevalence of drug courts in state court
systems around the country may, as noted above, be one indicator of an incipient seismic
shift in public and professional attitudes toward drug crime. But just as the "drug war" has
been criticized as a failure, drug courts have critics every bit as vociferous in their skepti-
cism of the new rehabilitationism. Whether the drug court movement continues to grow
will depend in large part on who wins the argument about whether drug courts "work," in
the sense of decreasing drug use and dependence, and reducing recidivism rates for non-
drug crime among defendants who pass through them.
Indeed, the argument about the efficacy of drug courts has significance in the larger drug
policy debate. If drug courts work, then their success is an important argument for de-
[Are] even significant incremental
reductions in illicit drug usage ...
ultimately worth the monetary and
human costs imposed by a primarily
law-enforcement-based drug
strategy?
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creased emphasis on interdiction and incarceration, or at the least for augmentation of
current strategies with more rehabilitative programs. If drug court critics are right, if drug
courts are no more effective than the systems they replace or augment, then the case for
generalized reform is weakened.
We are pleased to host a debate between nationally prominent participants in the drug
court controversy. Judge Morris Hoffman, a state district court judge in Denver, Colorado,
questions the efficacy of drug courts and suggests that they are fundamentally incompatible
with traditional conceptions of due process and the proper role of judges." William Meyer is a
former state judge from the same Denver district as Judge Hoffman and the Senior Judicial
Fellow of the National Drug Court Institute. Bill Ritter is the elected District Attorney of
Denver. Judge Meyer and District Attorney Ritter co-founded the Denver Drug Court. In their
article, they respond to Judge Hoffman's critique of drug courts, and they argue that drug
courts have proven their effectiveness.-2 Judge Hoffman then replies to their argument.'3
Erosion: The Downward Movement of Federal Drug Sentences
Criticisms of the "drug war" from academics, the media, liberal activists, and the defense bar
have been legion for years. However, as I intimated above, significant change of current anti-
drug policy is unlikely absent the urging, or at least the tacit consent, of the majority of
judges, prosecutors, and police officials who administer and enforce current laws. Here, too,
some signs point in the direction of gradual seismic shift.
One such sign may be the gradual erosion over the past decade of the average sentence
length imposed for federal drug offenses. In a pair of recent studies, my colleague Michael
Heise and I examined the little-known fact that, although the length of federal drug sentences
climbed sharply through the i98o's (particularly after the enactment of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, and the advent of the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines in 1987), the average length of federal drug sentences peaked in 1992, but has
been declining ever since.'4 This decline was a surprise to practically everyone when it was
first pointed out two years ago.' 5 It certainly ran contrary to common perceptions. Why has it
happened? To summarize, Professor Heise and I found three basic things.
First, some statutory and Guidelines changes in the early 199os exerted downward
pressure on drug sentence length. These changes were enacted by Congress and the Com-
mission with the intention, or at least the knowledge, that sentences for certain categories of
drug offender would be reduced from the very high levels in effect at the beginning of the
1990s.
Second, a large increase in marijuana cases in the five Mexican border districts (S.D.
California, Arizona, New Mexico, W.D. Texas, and S.D. Texas) starting around 1996,
combined with a so-called "fast track" program in which the U.S. Attorneys in those districts
offered extra sentence discounts for early pleas, caused some decline in national average
sentence length between 1996 and 1999.,6
Third, nonetheless, neither the changes in the law nor the border activity are sufficient to
explain the size or persistence of the drop. Rather, all the evidence points to a steady increase
from 1992 onward in discretionary choices by front-line sentencing actors -judges, prosecu-
tors, probation officers and defense attorneys- in the direction of shortening drug sentences.
This discretion manifested itself in increased plea bargain rates, increased rates of acceptance
of responsibility reductions, increased rates of downward role adjustments combined with
reduced rates of upward role adjustments, higher proportions of sentences imposed at the
low end of guideline ranges, lower rates of upward departures, increased rates of downward
departures for reasons other than substantial assistance to the government,' 7 the use of
charge and fact bargaining, and in other ways.
In short, Congress, the Sentencing Commission, and front-line sentencing actors such as
judges and prosecutors all contributed to the gradual nudging down of drug sentence length.
Moreover, the persistent use of discretionary mechanisms to lower drug sentences by those
most directly responsible for enforcing federal drug laws at least suggests some disenchant-
ment, not necessarily with a law enforcement approach to narcotics control, but at the least
with the severity of the penalties the law demands.
In this issue of FSR, John Scalia, formerly a statistician with both the Bureau of Justice
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Statistics and the Sentencing Commission, takes his own look at the decline in federal drug
sentences (which he believes did not begin until 1995)." Mr. Scalia concludes that the
decline "can be partially attributed to three factors: (i) the greater influence of sentences for
marijuana defendants - both the increase in the number of defendants convicted of
trafficking marijuana and decrease in the average imposed sentence; (2) the increase in the
number of defendants receiving a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines, for
substantial assistance and other reasons; (3) the impact of the 'safety valve' that exempted
certain defendants from otherwise applicable mandatory penalties and reduce the guideline
range by two levels."'9
Although Professor Heise and I agree that each of the factors Scalia identifies had some
effect on declining federal drug sentence length, we have some difficulties with the
particulars of his analysis and are disposed to think he has markedly oversimplified a very
complex problem.
For example, Scalia points out that the percentage of marijuana cases in the federal
system increased from 26% to 31% from 1995-99. He implies that this increase would
necessarily lower the average federal drug sentence (because marijuana cases have a lower
average sentence than cases involving the other four major drug types prosecuted in federal
court: crack cocaine, powder cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine). It is doubtless true
that if all other factors were held constant, an increase in proportion of marijuana cases
would lower the average drug sentence. However, the real question, which Scalia does not
answer, is how the changes in proportions of the five major drug types affected average
sentence length. In other words, the increase in low-sentence marijuana cases could have
been offset by relative increases in the proportion of high-sentence crack or methamphet-
amine cases. As it happens, Professor Heise and I considered the question of changing drug
type mix using a number of approaches and concluded that the increase in marijuana cases
probably did exert some downward effect on average drug sentences between 1996-99.,°
However, that conclusion is not derivable from the simple observation that the percentage of
marijuana cases increased.
Similarly, Scalia asserts that the length of the average drug sentence declined between
1995 and 1999 in part because the average prison term imposed in marijuana cases
declined from 45 to 34 months.", While this is doubtless true, so far as it goes, Scalia fails to
mention that the average sentence for every other major drug type dropped as well during
the same period-cocaine: 89.4 to 79.1 months; crack: 130.7 to 120.3 months; methamphet-
amine: 02.i to 88.8 months; and heroin: 63.6 to 61.6 months. Thus, marijuana is only part
of the story
Even more fundamentally, saying that the average marijuana sentence dropped is merely
an observation, a datum - it is not an explanation. An explanation would tell us why the
average marijuana sentence dropped. Was it a decline in average drug quantity per defen-
dant? An increase in percent and size of downward departures in marijuana cases? A
change in the average role of marijuana defendants or in their average criminal history
category? What?
At least part of the explanation for the decrease in average marijuana sentences probably
lies in another consideration Scalia does not mention -the fact that between 1995 and 1997
U.S. Attorneys in the Mexican border districts from which most of the increase in mari-
juana cases sprang adopted a "fast track" system offering extraordinary sentencing conces-
sions to low-level, mostly marijuana defendants who agree to plea guilty pre-indictment.-"
Scalia's conclusion that increases in downward departures in drug cases were a signifi-
cant factor in moving the average drug sentence downward is also subject to some question.
The problem is that Scalia relies on the fact that the total percentage of downward depar-
tures (both substantial assistance departures under U.S.S.G. 15KI.i, and non-substantial
assistance departures under U.S.S.G. S5K2.o) increased by 3% from 1995-99, but he does
not consider whether the average length of departures increased or decreased during this
period. As it happens, the average length of a substantial assistance departure in a drug case
actually decreased by thirteen months from 1995-99, from 51 to 38 months. 3
Moreover, the percentage of substantial assistance departures declined by 3% during the
same period. While that percentage decline was more than offset by the increase of non-
The average sentence for every
major drug type dropped [between
1995 and 1999].
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substantial assistance departures, it is important to note that non-substantial assistance
departures are, on average, about one-third the size of substantial assistance departures.4
Thus, in addition to the decline in the average length of substantial assistance departures
between 1995 and 1999, during the same period, in 3% of drug cases, the system substituted
short non-substantial assistance departures for longer substantial assistance departures. In
sum, without more analysis than either we or Scalia have performed to date, it is unclear
what effect changes in departure practice had on average drug sentences between 1995 and
1999.
Finally, Scalia asserts that the "safety valve" amendments to the drug statutes and drug
guidelines reduced average drug sentences between 1995 and 1999. The statutory "safety
valve" passed in 1994 permitted certain first-time non-violent drug offenders to receive
sentences below the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum.5 The guideline "safety
valve," enacted a year later, awarded a two-offense-level reduction to the same class of first-
time non-violent drug defendants. As with the increase in marijuana cases, Professor Heise
and I would not disagree that the safety valve caused some decline in average drug sentences,
but again, the effect seems to us less certain, and its mechanism more complex, than Scalia
implies.
In the first place, Scalia does not mention the critical fact that the guideline safety valve
was enacted in I995,6 and came into full effect in 1996. In 1996, i9.2% of all drug defen-
dants received a two-level guideline safety valve adjustment, and one can hardly doubt that
this had an immediate impact on average sentences. Indeed, the average sentence dropped
dramatically in 1995-96, from 88.7 to 82.5 months.7 However, thereafter, the percentage of
defendants receiving the safety valve increased very modestly in 1996-97 and held virtually
dead level in 1997-99." So the safety valve certainly had a direct and immediate impact in
1996, and arguably a lesser direct impact in 1997, but it is difficult to explain the continued
relative decline of average drug sentences from 1997-99 by reference to the safety valve. Or if
one is going to argue that the safety valve had a big role throughout 1995-99, the argument
has to be a more subtle one - namely that the safety valve not only conferred a direct benefit,
but by eliminating the barrier of mandatory minimum sentences in many cases permitted a
variety of other discretionary choices by judges and prosecutors which reduced sentences.
In the end, Professor Heise'and I feel that a simple three-factor explanation of the long
slow decline in federal drug sentence length cannot capture the complex reality of the
phenomenon. Likewise, we remain cautiously confident in our conclusion that some part of
the motivation of the discretionary choices made by the judges and lawyers is a widely
shared, if not universal, judgment that the federal drug sentences mandated by strict
interpretation of the law are often longer than necessary. If we are right, then support for
current drug policy among criminal law professionals may have eroded far enough that one
of the preconditions for reconfiguration of the drug policy terrain may be in place.
The Caldera: Race and Drugs
Erosion is slow, the incremental, grain-by-grain removal of once-solid landforms. Volcanism
can transform a landscape quickly and violently. If any factor at play in the drug debate
conjures images of heat and explosive power, it is the issue of race. The federal sentencing
guidelines were enacted in part to ensure race-neutral justice. The destructive impact of drugs
on individuals and of drug markets on communities is perhaps most acutely observable in
minority, inner city neighborhoods. Nonetheless, and however benign the motives of those
who drafted and now enforce the nation's drug laws, those laws are widely perceived to be
racially discriminatory in both purpose and effect.
The materials in this Issue are illustrative of several common themes in the ongoing
debate on race and drug policy in America. No one denies that young male members of
minority groups, principally African Americans and Latinos, are imprisoned for drug offenses
at rates far higher than their proportion of the general population. However, there is consider-
able dispute about why this is so, and what, if anything, ought to be done about it.
One thread of the argument is over whether there is unjustifiable racial disparity in drug
sentencing. The curious and disconcerting fact is that a number of highly qualified social
scientists have examined federal drug sentencing data and arrived at diametrically opposite
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conclusions. Two articles in this Issue illustrate the phenomenon. Paula Kautt analyzes
federal drug sentences for 1998-99 and concludes that black drug defendants suffer
statistically significant disparate treatment under the guidelines. In particular, she finds that
black defendants receive higher sentences than similarly situated white defendants with the
same offense level.'9 In stark contrast, John Scalia examines the drug sentences imposed on
white, black, and Hispanic defendants in both 1986 (before the Guidelines) and 1999. He
creates a model which attempts to determine how members of one racial group would have
been sentenced if they belonged to another racial group. He concludes that "black defen-
dants appear to receive a benefit at sentencing. Though sentences imposed on black
defendants were substantially higher than those received by white or Hispanic defendants,
estimated sentences for black defendants are significantly lower than what they would have
received if black defendants were treated as whites or Hispanics. "3° Whether Kautt or Scalia
is correct, or whether their results can be reconciled, is unknown. FSR would welcome
commentary from readers with expertise in quantitative analysis, both regarding the
particular conclusions of Kautt and Scalia and regarding the merits of the two competing
bodies of work these two authors represent.
Regardless of one's conclusion about whether drug laws are enforced in a discriminatory
way or with discriminatory motives, there is, as noted above, no dispute that drug enforce-
ment has a statistically disproportionate impact on minority groups. The universally
recognized - one might fairly say notorious - exemplar of this phenomenon is the quantity-
based sentence differential between crack and powder cocaine. A defendant convicted of
possessing 5 grams of crack receives the same five-year minimum mandatory sentence as a
defendant found to possess with intent to distribute 50o grams of powder cocaine. And this
ioo-to-i powder-to-crack ratio is replicated in the guidelines at every quantity level. The
rationality of the xoo-to-i ratio has been questioned since its adoption. But the facts that
make it notorious are that crack defendants receive the highest average sentences among
federal drug offenders and more than 8o% of all crack defendants in federal court are
African American.3'
Whether racially motivated or not, whether rationally supportable or not, for the Ameri-
can black community, the ioo-to-i crack-powder ratio has become a symbol of racial
injustice in federal criminal law. Doubtless for this reason among others, when the Sentenc-
ing Commission announced its intention in January 2002 to review the structure of federal
drug sentencing, it identified its as its first priority a reexamination of cocaine sentencing
generally and the crack-powder ratio in particular. Readers who have followed federal
sentencing over the past decade will be aware that the Commission's resolution to reform
cocaine sentencing displayed considerable political fortitude. In 1995, the Commission
passed an amendment attempting to equalize the crack-powder ratio. Congress vetoed it. Of
over 6oo guideline amendments passed by the Commission since 1987, the crack-powder
equalization amendment was one of only two to have been rejected by Congress.
This year, the Commission embarked on its spring deliberations in the apparent
confidence that things were different, that the slow subterranean realignments of plates and
blocks had progressed far enough that the impossible task of 1995 would be the manageable
accomplishment of 2o2. The second half of this Issue is largely a collection of primary
materials describing the Commission's effort to reform cocaine sentencing -the issues for
comment published in January 2002, transcripts of the extensive hearings held in February
and March on the pharmacology and epidemiology of cocaine abuse, the state of social
science research on violence associated with cocaine markets, and the views of criminal
practitioners, public interest groups, the U.S. Judicial Conference, and the Department of
Justice.
What emerges unmistakably from these materials is that the Commission was hoping to
promulgate an amendment reducing the crack-powder ratio for guideline sentences, and to
convince Congress either to amend the statutes embodying the ioo-to-i ratio for mandatory
minimum sentences, or at least to ignore the discontinuity between a new guideline and the
mandatory minimum statute. Equally unmistakable is the conclusion that concerted
opposition from the Department of Justice (expressed personally to the Commission by
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson3l) and Rep. Lamar Smith, of the House Judiciary
Whether racially motivated or not,
whether rationally supportable or
not, for the American black commu-
nity, the 100-to-1 crack-powder ratio
has become a symbol of racial
injustice in federal criminal law.
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Committee," dissuaded the Commission from passing an amendment on crack. Rather, the
Commission contented itself with conveying to Congress, once again, a report recommend-
ing congressional action to amend the statutory crack-powder ratio."
But the story of the 2002 federal drug policy debate does not end with the strangulation of
cocaine sentencing reform. The Commission did pass an amendment generally applicable to
all drug types which caps at 30 the offense level of any defendant who receives a mitigating
role adjustment. This amendment was the product of concerns that drug quantity, while an
important indicator of offense seriousness, sometimes overwhelms considerations of a
defendant's role in the offense. Despite the modest mitigating effect of this amendment,
Congressman Smith promptly introduced legislation to veto it. We reproduce here the
testimony by Commission General Counsel Charles Tetzlaff before Congressman Smith's
subcommittee in response to the proposed legislation. As we go to press in June, 2002, the
fate of the Smith legislation and the Commission's amendment remains unclear."
Asteroid? 9/11 and the Drug Policy Debate
What conclusions, if any, can be drawn from the Sentencing Commission's 2002 drug policy
adventure? Were they just bad geologists - counting on an earthquake before sufficient
pressure had built up along the fault line? Or did their careful creation of a record and their,
perhaps laudable, political caution merely help to prepare the ground for a future
reconfiguration of the policy landscape? It is too early to predict.
I would, however, tentatively suggest two things. First, I remain convinced that the
national mood is turning, slowly but surely, away from an exclusively law-enforcement-based
model of drug abuse control (although I am not at all sure where we are headed or how fast).
Second, I have a sense that, like an asteroid striking the Earth, the events of 9/ti disrupted the
evolution of the drug debate, albeit in ways that are hard to specify.
In this Issue, Sandra Guerra Thompson suggests that the post-9/ii "war on terrorism"
may cause a marked de-escalation of the "war on drugs."36 That may prove true, particularly
from the point of view of resource allocation. However, I suspect that the terror attacks on
America and their aftermath may have generated a contrary trend at those levels of the
national government where policy, politics, and public rhetoric intersect. At a moment in
which strength, toughness, and tenacity in opposition to dangerous adversaries are (quite
properly) the fashionable public virtues, those in the Administration and Congress who
support unwavering pursuit of the "war on drugs" are in tune with the mood of the times. By
contrast, those voices in the drug debate who oppose law-enforcement-based drug policies are
easily caricatured as appeasers. And even those who support active use of the criminal law to
combat drugs, but are willing to entertain the adjustment of moderation of existing policies,
can be portrayed, not as wise, but as weak.
This, at least, is my sense of the psychic geology of this spring's cocaine policy debate.
Whatever forces may have been building in support of federal drug policy reform were, at
least for the present, suppressed or diverted by 9/i and its aftermath. What remains to be
seen is whether the terror attacks will prove to have been the drug policy equivalent of the
asteroid that brought on the mass extinction of the dinosaurs, an unexpected catastrophe that
completely and permanently redirects the course of events away from what formerly had
seemed inevitable. On balance, this seems unlikely. More probably, 9/I will prove more akin
to an earthquake that throws up an earthen barrier in the path of a river -eventually, the
persistent power of water seeking its proper level will cut a way through the obstruction and
return the current to its former course.
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